The Demise of California's Public Schools Reconsidered | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
by D. Roderick Kiewiet    
 
For those of you who may not know, Proposition 13 was a statewide initiative that rolled back property-tax valuations significantly for then-current property owners. (This has led to huge disparities in tax bills for similar houses on nearby lots, depending on whether the owner bought the house pre- or post-Proposition 13; this has caused a lot of interesting socioeconomic behavior, but that's another story.) Proposition 13 also stipulated that in the future, local property taxes would be calculated at 1 percent of the price at which a property last sold, plus an allowance for a 2 percent per year increase. And, quite obviously, at least for a while, it reduced the amount of income that state and local governments were able to derive from property taxes. Then, in 1979, a companion measure, Proposition 4, the Gann initiative, limited increases in state spending to the rate of inflation plus the rate of population growth—a double whammy.

But public education got a triple whammy, with the third being the Serrano decisions. In the original Serrano decision (Serrano v. Priest, 1971), the California Supreme Court ruled that the existing system of public finance, which was essentially the local property tax, was unconstitutional. The reasoning was that all children in California had a fundamental right to equal public education, but if the funds for that education had to come from the local property-tax base a child living in, say, Baldwin Park could expect substantially less support than a child living in Beverly Hills. The good people of Baldwin Park would have to tax themselves at a rate perhaps 10 times higher than the people in Beverly Hills to support the same level of expenditure in their local school district. Serrano forbade local school districts, at least as school districts, from spending more per pupil than the state average. (There are ways around this—some wealthier school districts have put together private foundations that have by now raised very substantial sums. No one really knows how much, because not everything they do has to be reported, but according to a recent study, such foundation money supplements spending in many districts by as much as 15 percent.) On the other hand, Serrano also stipulated that the state government would give the poorer districts as much money as was needed to bring their per-pupil spending up to the norm. The decision went through the courts for a while; Serrano II, in 1976, basically required its very rapid implementation, and by 1982, for all practical purposes, it was in place. So the widespread belief is that the reduction in tax take from Proposition 13 and its companion measures, plus the Serrano equalization mandate, led to a dramatic decline in public kindergarten-through-12th-grade education in California.

In a recent book called Paradise Lost: California's Experience, America's Future, Peter Schrag, a long-time editorial-page editor for the Sacramento Bee, says that "the passage of Proposition 13 serves as a convenient way of dividing the post—World War II era in California between the postwar period of optimism, with its huge investment in public infrastructure and its strong commitment to the development of quality education systems and other public services, and a generation of declining confidence and shrinking public services." I think this captures the view shared by a very large number of people: Proposition 13 is a watershed event that demarcates a much nicer and more glorious past from a fairly troubling present and future. With that, let's take a look at the actual data.



Above: State and local per-pupil spending on public schools (kindergarden through 12th grade) in California (red) and the average for the rest of the United States (black). The arrow marks the passage of Proposition 13 in california; a decline in spending followed immediatetly

The plot to the left shows per-pupil spending from 1968 through 1996 in California (the red line), versus the rest of the United States. (I have converted all the data here and throughout into constant 1997 dollars. At this point, I would also like to thank grad student and Excel guru Erik Terreri, who gave me a great deal of assistance in getting all this data together.) You can see that there's reason to believe that Schrag is right—the timing is right on the money. Before 1982, we spent somewhat more, per pupil, than the rest of the country. After that we tracked the other states from below for a while, and then we fell dramatically behind in the late '80s as the recession kicked in. I should mention that the link between expenditures and student preformance is not very strong.
[For more thoughts on this topic] I also should mention that by "the rest of the country," I don't mean the national average. With California now containing about 12 percent of the country's population, we've got enough weight to swing the national average around. I mean the average expenditure of all the states except California and Alaska. Alaska has a public-finance system that looks a lot more like Saudi Arabia's than an American state's, so it's not usually included in these kinds of analyses.

The Demise of California's Public Schools Reconsidered | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
by D. Roderick Kiewiet